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Abstract 
 
Oaxaca’s study (1973), along with the China Health and Nutrition Survey (CHNS) 
questionnaire (2004 and 2006 pooling data), is used as the basis for this study in 
estimating the formal-informal employment hourly income differential, as well as the 
formal and informal male-female employment hourly income differential in urban 
China. The results indicate that differences in the characteristics between formal and 
informal employment account for a much higher percentage of the hourly income 
differential than do discrimination. In addition, ignoring the sample selection bias, one 
finds the formal male-female, the informal male-female hourly income differential and 
the degree of discrimination against informal women’s employment will be 
overestimated; conversely, the degree of discrimination against formal women’s 
employment will be underestimated. 
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1. Introduction 
 
Although informal employment has existed in China since 1949, informal employment 
as a fully developed concept is new. Until 1978, the ideological emphasis upon state 
and collective ownership severely limited the scope for other types of ownership of 
enterprise (for example by private, self-employed individuals), and back then informal 
employment existed on a small scale only. In the wake of reforms in 1978, particularly 
in the 1990s, other types of business ownership rapidly expanded. With the 
intensification of state enterprise reform from the mid-1990s onwards, and subsequent 
mass redundancies, the Chinese Government has taken an increasing interest in other 
forms of ownership of enterprise as a means of addressing the issue of unemployment. 
On the other hand, state and collective enterprises have also made use of informal 
employment, in order to cut costs. From the supply side, without taking into account 
mass redundancies by state- and collective-owned enterprises, the effect of heavy 
migrations from rural areas and new entrants into the labor market every year, has been 
to sharply increase informal employment. 
Economists estimate informal employment based on differences between household 
labor survey statistics and employment figures provided by enterprises (the former is 
larger than the latter), based on the particular Chinese statistical system. That is, 
informal employment refers to the part of employment which is not recorded because 
enterprises do not report it for various reasons (Cai and Wang, 2004; Wu and Li, 2006). 
Using this methodology, the informal employment is estimated to have been about 
23,130,000 in 1990, which approximate number was maintained until 1996. Informal 
employment rapidly increased from 1997, and rose to 174,610,000 in 2005. On the 
other hand, the share of informal employment also rose, and exceeded 30 per cent from 
1999. The share of informal employment is shown in figure 1. 
In China, persons employed in the formal sector have a much higher average income 
than those in informal employment. As shown in Table 1, according to the 2004 and 
2006 pooling data of the China Health and Nutrition Survey (CHNS)1 questionnaire, in 
2005, the average income of those in formal employment2 in urban China was 8.7 yuan 
an hour, while the average income of those informally employed was 5.3 yuan an hour, 
that is, 60.9 percent of those in formal employment. On the other hand, women have 
lower average earnings than men, and the male-female average earnings differentials are 
                                                  
1 Source: http://www.cpc.unc.edu/projects/china 
2 The definition of formal employment in this paper will be introduced in detail in section 3. 
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widening3. According to CHNS, in 2005, the average formal male and informal male 
employment income in urban China was 8.9 yuan and 5.8 yuan an hour, respectively, 
while the average formal female and informal female employment income was 8.3 yuan 
and 4.9 yuan an hour, respectively, that is, female employment yielded 93.3 and 84.5 
percent of male earnings. 
This paper provides answers to the following questions: what factors affect the hourly 
income differentials between formal employment and informal employment, between 
formal male employment and formal female employment, and between informal male 
employment and informal female employment. In particular, how much impact does 
labor market discrimination have on informal employment and female hourly income? 
Section 2 introduces the literature; section 3 presents the data and the definitions of 
variables; section 4 presents the empirical results; and the final section offers 
concluding remarks. 
 
 
2. Selected Literature Survey 
 
Before introducing the literature, it is essential to first clarify the characteristics of the 
term “informal employment”. ILO (2002) characterizes informal employment as 
follows: Under the expanded concept, informal employment is understood to include all 
remunerative work—both self-employment and wage employment—that is not 
recognized, regulated, or protected by existing legal or regulatory frameworks as well as 
non-remunerative work undertaken in an income-producing enterprise. Most informal 
workers—including both self-employed and wage workers—are deprived of secure 
work, worker’s benefits, social protection, and representation or voice. The 
self-employed have to take care of themselves and their enterprises. Moreover, they 
often face a competitive disadvantage vis-à-vis larger formal firms in capital and 
product markets. Informal wage workers also have to take care of themselves as they 
receive few (if any) employer-sponsored benefits. Moreover, both groups receive little 
(if any) legal or social protection. As a result of these and other factors, a higher 
percentage of people working in the informal economy, compared to those working in 
the formal economy, are poor.  
In recent decades, developing countries have experienced a steady and substantial 
increase in the share of workers characterized by informal employment status. ILO 
                                                  
3 Women’s Studies Institute of China (WSIC) (2006) indicated that in 1978, the average number of 
earning females in urban units was 83 percent of that of males; however, it fell to 81.9 percent in 2003. 
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(2002) indicates informal employment as a percentage of non-agricultural employment 
in some regions in 2000 as follows: 48 per cent in North Africa (Algeria, 43; Morocco, 
45; Tunisia, 50; Egypt, 55); 72 per cent in Sub-Saharan Africa (Benin, 93; Chad, 74; 
Guinea, 72; Kenya, 72; South Africa, 51); 51 per cent in Latin America (Bolivia, 63; 
Brazil, 60; Chile, 36 Colombia, 38; Costa Rica, 44; El Salvador, 57; Guatemala, 56; 
Honduras, 58; Mexico, 55; Dominican Republic, 48; Venezuela, 47); 65 per cent in 
Asia (India, 83; Indonesia, 78; Philippines, 72; Thailand, 51; Syria, 42).  
A number of explanations have been offered to account for the rise in informal 
employment. Portes and coauthors provide a dynamic view of the growth of informal 
employment in the context of import substitution and export-oriented development 
strategies (Portes, 1989, 1994; Portes and Schauffler, 1993). Other studies similarly 
describe the linkages between export-oriented and multinational firms and informal 
employment through, for instance, subcontracting arrangements and export-processing 
zones, and thus the linkages more generally between globalization and informality (Carr 
and Chen, 2001; de Oliveira and Roberts, 1994; Maloney, 1997). Another explanation 
proffered to account for the growing share of informal employment is that higher labor 
standards in the formal sector may lead to a higher share of informal employment 
(World Bank, 1995). Whereas, in contrast, Galli and Kucera (2004) find that countries 
with higher labor standards tend to have higher shares of formal employment and lower 
shares of informal employment for 14 Latin American countries in the 1990s. 
Many of the empirical studies in more recent years seem to indicate wage differences 
between formal and informal workers. Marcouiller, Ruiz, and Woodruff (1997) applied 
wage regressions to calculate unexplained wage gaps between the two sectors. The 
results showed that significant wage premiums are associated with work in the formal 
sector in El Salvador and Peru, whereas, in contrast, a premium is associated with 
informal work in Mexico. Tansel (2000) carried out an analysis for men and women 
workers separately, using the 1994 Turkish Household Expenditure Survey, defining 
uncovered wage earners and self-employed as part of the informal sector, while covered 
wage earners were considered part of the formal sector. The results indicated substantial 
earnings differences between the formal and informal sectors for men but not for 
women. Also, for Mexico, Gong and van Soest (2002) found that wage differentials 
between the formal and informal sectors are typically small for the lesser educated and 
become more significant with increasing levels of education. In addition, Pratap and 
Quintin (2006) find that, after controlling for selection, no wage premium remains and 
job satisfaction is not lower in the informal sector in the Argentinean data. 
Cai and Wang (2004) provide an approach to estimating total informal employment 
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in urban China, based on the particular statistics system. Hu and Li (2006) indicate that 
about 90 per cent of the observed informal employment and formal employment 
monthly income differential can be explained by differences in observed characteristics 
in urban China 2003.  
This paper will clarify what factors affect the hourly income differentials between 
formal and informal employment, and provide a more accurate and up-to-date measure 
of the hourly income differentials between formal male and formal female employment, 
and between informal male and informal female employment in China, taking into 
account the possible selectivity bias. 
 
 
3. Data and the Definitions of Variables 
 
This paper uses the data derived from the CHNS (2004 and 2006) questionnaire4. The 
questionnaires for CHNS 2004 and 2006 were distributed in 9 provinces, namely, 
Heilongjiang, Jiangsu, Shandong, Guizhou, Guangxi, Hubei, Henan, Hunan, and 
Liaoning (18 cities with 216 neighborhoods, and 36 counties with 432 villages). The 
data in this paper, on the other hand, make use of the urban household data only.  
In section 2, multiple contending definitions of formal and informal employment are 
used in the empirical studies literature. Because of data availability, here we identify 
individuals who “work for another person or enterprise as a permanent employee” as 
being engaged in formal employment 5 . On the other hand, we define informal 
employment as the work of those who are “self-employed” or who is “a contractor with 
other people or enterprise” or “a temporary worker” or “paid family worker”. That is, 
in line with the Chinese economy and data availability, employment is considered 
formal employment when the employment is permanent, rather than being determined 
by if the employment is in formal enterprise.  
In this paper, income includes wages, bonuses and subsidies (grocery subsidy, health 
allowance, bath and haircut allowance, book and newspaper allowance, housing and 
other subsidies). In accordance with the standard practice, the following were excluded 
from the analysis: students, agricultural workers, members of the armed forces, the 
                                                  
4 The data for 2003 and 2005 are pooled for our analysis. We also convert the income in 2003 into the 
income for 2005, taking into account the price increase (or decrease) in each province. 
5 The 2003 and 2005 CHNS data includes the questionnaire: What is your employment position in this 
occupation? 1. self-employed, owner-manager with employees; 2. self-employed, independent operator 
with no employees; 3. works for another person or enterprise as a permanent; 4. contractor with other 
people or enterprise; 5. temporary worker; 6. paid family worker ; 7. unpaid family worker; 8. other; 9. 
unknown.  
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disabled, retired employees who were rehired, and male household workers. Also 
excluded were all persons aged 15 or less (China’s labor law sets the minimum 
employment age at 16 years) as well as respondents who provided incomplete 
information on income, education, household composition, or other details. After the 
exclusions, the sample comprised 2,526 working individuals (1,593 men and 933 
women) between the ages of 16 (school-leaving age) and 55 (state retirement age for 
women) or 60 (state retirement age for men)—all of whom earn incomes from a main 
job—and 441 females aged 16–55 doing housework (non-working women). Using the 
above definitions of formal and informal employment, informal employment as a 
percentage of non-agricultural employment is 36.9 in 2005, similar to the 36.1 obtained 
from the China Statistical Book 2006, using Cai and Wang’s (2004) approach6. 
In separate survey questions, the respondents were asked to indicate the average daily 
working hours and the average weekly working days. The hourly income can be 
calculated from the annual income and working hours. The dependent variable used in 
the income equations is the log of hourly cash income earned from the main job. 
Earnings from secondary jobs and nonmonetary benefits were excluded from the 
analysis.   
The survey includes eight categories of education, based on academic degrees. Three 
education level dummies (DS1, DS2, and DS3) were included in hourly income 
equations. The duration of job training is not observed in the present data; hence, the 
variable of experience or tenure (years employed in the present job) could not be 
controlled with a direct measure. Instead, age was used, entered in both linear (AGE) 
and quadratic forms (Age2). Additional variables include a set of dummies representing 
the type of minority (FOLK), household registration (HUKOU), marital status 
(MARRIED), locality (METRO), settlement area (EAST), occupation (TECHN, 
MANAGER, CRAF, and SEVCL), and the type of work unit (GOVOWN and COLOWN). 
EAST is set as 1 for Jiangsu and Shandong and as 0 for elsewhere, as the average annual 
income of on-post staff and workers in Jiangsu and Shandong is higher in 2005 (20,957 
yuan and 16,614 yuan, respectively) than in the other seven provinces7. HUKOU is set 
as 1 for urban household registrations and as 0 for rural household registrations. 
However, people who belong to households registered as rural are not rural migrants, 
but live in the suburban villages of the city. The definitions, means, and standard 
deviations of these variables are presented in Table A1 and Table A2 in the Appendix.  
 
                                                  
6 Definition of informal employ in this paper is not completely consistent with the one by Cai and Wang 
(2004). 
7 Source: China Labor Statistical Yearbook 2006 
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4. Empirical Results 
 
Table 2 presents the results of the formal and informal employment hourly income 
functions. The effect of all education levels is positive and significant in two equations. 
The coefficients of AGE and AGE2 are significant in the informal employment hourly 
income equation; however, only AGE is positive and significant in the other equation. 
The results confirm that the hourly incomes of males are higher than those of females in 
both formal and informal employment. There are also significant and positive effects in 
relation to locality (METRO), settlement area (EAST) and occupation (TECHN and 
CRAFT). Being a formal government employee is associated with higher hourly 
incomes, but the coefficient is not significant in the other equation. On the other hand, a 
worker in a collective enterprise is associated with less hourly income, particularly for 
informal employment. 
However, working women may not be randomly sampled from the overall female 
population. Heckman (1979) proposed a two-step correction procedure to address this 
problem. The first step of this procedure is to specify a participation equation for 
women in the form of a Probit function. Using this function, a selectivity correction 
factor,λ , is estimated and is included in the female income equations as a regressor. 
This constitutes the second step and it yields coefficients that are free from the 
selectivity bias due to the endogenous participation decision. 
The Probit analysis on female participation is presented in Table 3. The effect of all 
education levels is positive and significant, indicating that women with higher education 
levels are more likely to participate in the labor force. As illustrated in Table 3, ethnic 
minorities are more likely to participate in the labor market. People from households 
registered as rural and living in outlying suburbs of the cities are less likely to participate 
in the labor market than people from households registered as urban. As women become 
older, the probability of participation increases, albeit at a decreasing rate. As expected, 
the effect of marital status for married women, as compared with single women, has a 
negative effect on the decision to work. The share of household members younger than 
7 years or older than 65 years reduces the probability of participation. The income of 
other family members is positive and significant. The last two variables are included in 
the female participation equation, but not in the female hourly income equations, in 
order to achieve identification. 
The results of hourly income regressions for formal and informal employment by sex 
are presented in Table 4. The fourth and seventh columns of Table 4 present the results 
of formal female and the informal female employment hourly income functions with 
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correction for selectivity bias, respectively. The selectivity bias terms are negative and 
significant. This indicates that women who have high-income opportunities, given their 
observed characteristics, have even better opportunities outside the wage and salary 
sector and are hence less likely to be included in our wage samples (Reimers, 1983). 
Since the selectivity bias terms are significant, OLS estimates as well as an 
income-differential decomposition based on OLS results would be biased. 
Following Oaxaca (1973) which uses the male hourly income structure as the 
nondiscriminatory norm, and taking into account the possible selectivity bias, the 
following equation can yield 
 
λβββ ffmfmfmfm cXXXWWD ˆ)ˆˆ(ˆ)(lnlnln −−′+′−′=−=          
 
The above equation decomposes the percentage difference between the geometric 
means of the observed hourly income rates for the two groups into three parts: the first 
part is due to the differences in the average characteristics of the groups, the second is 
due to differences in the parameters of the income function caused by labor market 
discrimination and other omitted factors, and the last ( λfcˆ ) is due to differences in 
selectivity bias8. 
Table 5 presents the observed formal-informal, formal male-female and informal 
male-female hourly income differential that can be attributed to the difference in 
characteristics and that cannot be explained by differences in observed characteristics. 
The latter, due to differences in the parameters of the income function, can be attributed 
to labor market discrimination and other omitted variables.  
The results of formal-informal hourly income differential indicate that differences in 
the characteristics between formal and informal employment accounts for a much 
higher percentage (76.35 percent) of the hourly income differential than do 
discrimination. On the other hand, the results of formal male-female and informal 
male-female hourly income differential obtained without correcting the sample selection 
bias indicate that discrimination accounts for a much higher percentage (141.67 percent, 
80.61 percent, respectively) of the hourly income differential than do differences in the 
characteristics between men and women. When correcting sample selection bias, formal 
male-female and informal male-female hourly income differential all decrease. 
However, the degree of discrimination against formal women’s employment rises to 
                                                  
8  The third part comprises differences between male selectivity bias and female selectivity bias 
( ˆ ˆm m f fc cλ λ− ); however, the sample of males aged 16–60 doing housework (nonworking men) is only 62; 
thus, we assume that male selectivity bias is zero. 
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169.28 percent, whereas the degree of discrimination against informal women’s 
employment descends to 72.24 percent. That is, if ignoring the sample selection bias, 
the formal male-female, the informal male-female hourly income differential and the 
degree of discrimination against informal women’s employment will be overestimated; 
conversely, the degree of discrimination against formal women’s employment will be 
underestimated. 
The impact of the independent variables on the explained and unexplained parts of 
the hourly income functions is presented in Table 6. The results of formal-informal 
hourly income differential indicate that education level dummies (DS1 and DS2) 
account for a large share of the difference in characteristics between formal and 
informal employment, that is, approximately 0.10. On the other hand, age and the type 
of work unit (GOVOWN) are also higher at approximately 0.11 and 0.13, respectively. 
With respect to the unexplained part, age squared (AGE2) is about 0.52. This is because 
the coefficient of age squared in informal employment hourly income function is 
negative and significant, whereas it is not significant in the other equation. On the other 
hand, the results of analysis of formal and informal male-female employment hourly 
income differential indicate that age (AGE) accounts for a large share of the unexplained 
differential between male and female employment, that is, approximately 1.39 and 2.92, 
respectively. This is interpreted in the sense that age contributes to discrimination 
between male and female employment in China, that is, the coefficient of age, both for 
formal male and informal male employment, is positive and significant, whereas that for 
female employment is not significant in this paper. 
 
 
5. Some Concluding Remarks 
 
Based on Oaxaca’s study (1973), and using the CHNS questionnaire (2004 and 2006 
pooling data), the formal-informal employment hourly income differential was 
estimated, and employing the Heckman two-step procedure for sample selection bias, 
new estimates were provided for formal and informal male-female employment hourly 
income differentials in urban China. 
First, the results indicate that differences in the characteristics between formal and 
informal employment account for a much higher percentage (76.35 percent) of the 
hourly income differential than do discrimination.  
Second, the results of formal male-female and informal male-female hourly income 
differential obtained without correcting the sample selection bias indicate that 
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discrimination accounts for a much higher percentage (141.67 percent, 80.61 percent, 
respectively) of the hourly income differential than do differences in the characteristics 
between men and women. When correcting sample selection bias, formal male-female 
and informal male-female hourly income differential all decrease, however, the degree 
of discrimination against formal women’s employment rises to 169.28 percent, whereas 
the degree of discrimination against informal women’s employment descends to 72.24 
percent. 
 Finally, the results of analysis of formal and informal male-female employment hourly 
income differential all indicate that age (AGE) accounts for a large share of the 
unexplained differential between male and female. The results indicate that the gender 
income differentials will decrease if the income of females rises with age through 
increased opportunities for promotion and the offering of other favorable treatment. 
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  Figure 1. The share of informal employment in urban China
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 Data source: Author-compiled, based on China Statistical Book 2006. 
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Table 1: Employment Status, Sex, and Average Income 
 
 
Total 
(%) 
Males 
(%) 
females
(%) 
Average year income 
(yuan) 
Average hourly income 
(yuan) 
 
   All males females All males females
Formal 
employment 
63.1 40.4 22.7 17 742 18235 16 864 8.7 8.9 8.3 
Informal 
employment 
36.9 18.4 18.5 11129 13236 9 027 5.3 5.8 4.9 
Total 100 58.8 41.2 15 300 16668 13 345 7.4 7.9 6.8 
 
Data source: Author-compiled, based on China Health and Nutrition Survey (CHNS) questionnaire (2004 
and 2006).
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TABLE 2. Results of hourly income regressions for formal employment and  
informal  employment 
 
Variables 
Formal employment Informal employment 
Coefficient t-value Coefficient t-value
       
CONSTANT 0.3039  1.1775 0.3025  0.9087
DS1 0.4222 *** 9.6990 0.3345 *** 5.2617
DS2 0.2692 *** 6.0851 0.1419 ** 2.0830
DS3 0.1179 *** 2.8133 0.1885 *** 3.6668
FOLK 0.0335  0.6292 –0.1327  –1.5758
HUKOU 0.1305 ** 2.2386 –0.0446  –0.7852
AGE 0.0259 * 1.8726 0.0452 ** 2.4185
AGE2 –0.0002  –1.3004 –0.0006 ** –2.4265
MARRIED –0.0068  –0.1176 –0.0239  –0.3185
SEX 0.1976 *** 6.8310 0.2542 *** 5.8852 
METRO 0.2378 *** 8.2112 0.3030 *** 7.0386
EAST 0.1277 ***  3.2553 0.3612 *** 7.5325
TECHN 0.3095 *** 7.2683 0.1679 * 1.7475
MANAGER 0.2942 *** 6.2745 0.0395  0.3868
CRAFT 0.2380 *** 5.5713 0.1789 ** 2.2002
SEVCL –0.0642  –1.0178 –0.2108 *** –4.4372
GOVOWN 0.2050 *** 4.4827 0.0421  0.7381
COLOWN –0.1807 *** –3.0753 –0.2157 *** –3.1380
2R  0.3316 0.2332 
N  1593 933 
 
Note: Numbers in parentheses are t ratios. 
***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at the 1, 5, and 10 percent levels, 
respectively.  
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TABLE 3. Results of the Probit analysis on female participation 
 
Variables 
Working women 
(n = 1040) 
Coefficient t  value dXdP
CONSTANT –1.8163 ** –2.0689 –0.3538
DS1 2.2179 *** 7.7313 0.4320
DS2 1.2268 *** 7.5544 0.2390
DS3 0.5244 *** 4.7681 0.1021
FOLK –0.6969 *** –3.2754 –0.1357
HUKOU 0.8728 *** 8.3525 0.1700
AGE 0.1613 *** 3.4274 0.0314
AGE2 –0.0025 *** –4.2023 –0.0005
MARRIED –0.9024 *** –3.5460 –0.1758
METRO 0.0536  0.5691 0.0104
EAST 0.5332 *** 4.0972 0.1039
RATE –0.9863 *** –3.2395 –0.1921
OFAMINC 0.0581 *** 10.5632 0.0113
Log likelihood –512.566 
N  1481 
Note: ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at the 1, 5, and 10 percent levels, 
respectively.  
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TABLE 4. Results of hourly income regressions for formal employment and informal  
employment by sex 
 
Variables 
Formal employment Informal employment 
Males Females(1) Females(2) Males Females(1) Females(2) 
CONSTANT 0.4629 
(1.4724) 
 0.5754 
(1.1959) 
 0.9532 
(1.8547) 
* 0.0759 
(0.1571) 
 1.0403 
(1.9696) 
* 1.5044 
(2.6570) 
***
DS1 0.3280 
(6.2812) 
*** 0.6379 
(8.1875) 
*** 0.5141 
(5.2255) 
*** 0.3690 
(3.6608) 
*** 0.2932 
(3.5541) 
*** 0.1747 
(1.7820) 
* 
DS2 0.2068 
(3.8950) 
*** 0.4185 
(5.2357) 
*** 0.3137 
(3.3137) 
*** 0.0540 
(0.4923) 
 0.1380 
(1.5752) 
 0.0357 
(0.3620) 
 
DS3 0.0751 
(1.4979) 
 0.2353 
(3.1146) 
*** 0.1912 
(2.4404) 
** 0.2108 
(2.8467) 
*** 0.1412 
(1.9850) 
** 0.0739 
(0.9583) 
 
FOLK 0.0579 
(0.9075) 
 –0.0315 
(–0.3293) 
 –0.0093 
(–0.0970)
 –0.1772 
(–1.4286)
 –0.1153 
(–1.0075) 
 –0.0812 
(–0.7061) 
 
HUKOU 0.1318 
(1.8354) 
* 0.0933 
(0.9476) 
 –0.0049 
(–0.0453)
 0.0340 
(0.4342) 
 –0.1129 
(–1.3567) 
 –0.2348 
(–2.3595) 
** 
AGE 0.0296 
(1.7262) 
* 0.0054 
(0.2072) 
 –0.0059 
(–0.2205)
 0.0695 
(2.5660) 
** 0.0052 
(0.1674) 
 –0.0129 
(–0.4042) 
 
AGE2 –0.0003 
(–1.4332) 
 0.0001 
(0.3550) 
 0.0003 
(0.8141) 
 –0.0009 
(–2.6518)
*** –0.0000 
(–0.0930) 
 0.0002 
(0.5371) 
 
MARRIED 0.0639 
(0.8386) 
 –0.1084 
(–1.1989) 
 –0.0850 
(–0.9348)
 –0.0131 
(–0.1123)
 –0.0614 
(–0.6184) 
 –0.0151 
(–0.1495) 
 
METRO 0.2107 
(5.7205) 
*** 0.2812 
(6.0266) 
*** 0.2805 
(6.0281) 
*** 0.3544 
(5.6411) 
*** 0.2612 
(4.3170) 
*** 0.2594 
(4.3043) 
***
EAST 0.0941 
(1.9061) 
* 0.1776 
(2.7474) 
*** 0.1597 
(2.4558) 
** 0.2881 
(4.1668) 
*** 0.4725 
(7.1220) 
***   0.4325 
(6.3134) 
***
TECHN 0.3096 
(5.9660) 
*** 0.2933 
(3.9467) 
*** 0.2911 
(3.9269) 
*** 0.2476 
(1.6569) 
* 0.1105 
(0.8815) 
 0.1198 
(0.9594) 
 
MANAGER 0.3789 
(6.9100) 
*** 0.1090 
(1.2385) 
 0.1079 
(1.2294) 
 0.2253 
(1.7127) 
* –0.3328 
(–2.0030) 
** –0.3474 
(–2.0982) 
** 
 
Continued 
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TABLE 4.  Continued 
 
Variables 
Formal employment Informal employment 
Males Females(1) Females(2) Males Females(1) Females(2) 
CRAFT 0.1954 
(3.6673) 
*** 0.2997 
(4.1301) 
*** 0.2978 
(4.1149) 
*** 0.1282 
(0.9684) 
 0.2499 
(2.3616) 
** 0.2424 
(2.2994) 
** 
SEVCL –0.0958 
(–1.0233) 
 0.0028 
(0.0313) 
 –0.0011 
(–0.0127)
 –0.3077 
(–4.1374)
*** –0.1097 
(–1.7246) 
* –0.1127 
(–1.7780) 
* 
GOVOWN 0.1961 
(3.4181) 
*** 0.2273 
(3.0263) 
*** 0.2297 
(3.0661) 
*** –0.0024 
(–0.0297)
 0.1254 
(1.5380) 
 0.1345 
(1.6541) 
* 
COLOWN –0.1756 
(–2.3232) 
** –0.1462 
(–1.5583) 
 –0.1455 
(–1.5549)
 –0.2273 
(–2.3234)
** –0.2122 
(–2.1868) 
** –0.2295 
(–2.3674) 
** 
λ  
 
 
 
 –0.2378 
(–2.0504)
** 
 
 
 
 –0.2462 
(–2.2125) 
** 
2R  0.2971 0.3937 0.3971 0.2005 0.2222 0.2289 
N  1020 573 573 466 467 467 
Note: Numbers in parentheses are t ratios. 
    Females (2) are results of hourly income regressions for females with correction for sample 
selection bias. 
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TABLE 5. Results of the decompositions (Oaxaca method) 
 
 Income differentials 
between formal and 
informal employment  
Income differentials between 
formal males and females 
employment 
Income differentials between 
informal males and females 
employment 
  With 
correction for 
sample 
selection bias
Without 
correction 
With 
correction for 
sample 
selection bias 
Without 
correction 
Total estimated 
differential 
0.5589 0.07912 0.13151 0.19632 0.28111  
Endowment 
differences 
0.4267 –0.05483 –0.05483 0.05453 0.05453 
Income 
discrimination 
0.1322 0.13394 0.18634 0.14184 0.22664 
Percentage due to 
endowments 
76.35 –69.28 –41.67 27.76 19.39 
Percentage due to 
discrimination 
23.65 169.28 141.67 72.24 80.61 
Note:  1. ln lnm fW W−    2. ˆln lnm f fW W c λ− +    3. ˆ( )m f mX X β′−   4. ˆ ˆ( )f m fX β β′ −    
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TABLE 6. Sources of hourly income differentials due to characteristics and discrimination 
in the corrected sample 
 
Income differentials   
between formal and  
informal employment 
Income differentials 
between formal male and 
female employment 
Income differentials 
between informal male 
and female employment
 explained unexplained explained unexplained explained unexplained
Hourly income 
differential 
0.5589 0.0791 0.1963 
Of which: 0.4267 0.1322 –0.0548 0.1339 0.0545 0.1418
Due to:   
DS1 0.0928 0.0142 –0.0325 –0.0828 –0.0307 0.0395
DS2 0.0138 0.0161 –0.0041 –0.0204 –0.0032 0.0029
DS3 –0.0082 –0.0162 0.0008 –0.0178 0.0019 0.0308
FOLK –0.0003 0.1562 –0.0010 0.0632 0.0000 –0.0902
HUKOU 0.0142 0.1441 –0.0007 0.1279 –0.0024 0.2309
AGE 0.1057 –0.7136 0.0902 1.3900 0.2210 2.9237
AGE2 –0.0700 0.5237 –0.0780 –0.9055 –0.2303 –1.4688
MARRIED –0.0004 0.0144 0.0002 0.1328 0.0002 0.0017
SEX 0.0278 –0.0283  
METRO –0.0034 –0.0250 –0.0177 –0.0295 0.0223 0.0334
EAST –0.0115 –0.0578 –0.0015 –0.0110 0.0020 –0.0352
TECHN 0.0667 0.0074 –0.0375 0.0064 –0.0048 0.0079
MANAGER 0.0278 0.0109 0.0163 0.0298 0.0058 0.0172
CRAFT 0.0248 0.0045 –0.0111 –0.0222 –0.0052 –0.0110
SEVCL 0.0188 0.0504 0.0049 –0.0079 0.0809 –0.0927
GOVOWN 0.1282 0.0262 0.0103 –0.0252 –0.0000 –0.0199
COLOWN –0.0002 0.0034 0.0063 –0.0036 –0.0030 0.0002
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APPENDIX 
Table A1. Definition of variables 
 
Variable Definition 
LOGINC Natural logarithm of hourly income 
DS1 1 for professional school (three-year college) or higher, 0 for others 
DS2 1 for technical or vocational degree, 0 for others 
DS3 1 for upper middle school degree, 0 for others 
FOLK 1 for Han, 0 for others 
HUKOU 1 for households registered as urban, 0 for households registered as rural 
AGE Age in years 
AGE2 Age squared 
MARRIED 1 for married, 0 for others 
SEX 1 for male, 0 for female 
METRO 1 for metropolitan, 0 for others 
EAST 1 for Jiangsu and Shandong, 0 for others 
TECHN 1 for technicians, 0 for others 
MANAGER 1 for managers, 0 for others 
CRAFT 1 for craft workers, 0 for others 
SEVCL 1 for service workers, 0 for others 
GOVOWN 1 for workers in government-owned enterprises or organizations, 0 for others 
COLOWN 1 for workers in collective enterprises, 0 for others 
RATE The share of household members who are younger than 7 years or older than 65 years 
OFAMINC Income of other family members (in thousands of RMB) 
λ  Inverse of Mill’s ratio, predicted from Probit equation using all observations of females 
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Table A2. Means and standard deviations of variables 
 
Variable 
Means and standard deviations 
Formal  Informal  Formal Informal 
(All) (All) (Males) (Females) (Males) (Females)
DS1 0.3817 
(0.4860) 
0.1618 
(0.3685) 
0.3461 
(0.4760) 
0.4450 
(0.4974) 
0.1202 
(0.3255) 
0.2034  
(0.4030) 
DS2 0.1777 
(0.3823) 
0.1265 
(0.3326) 
0.1706 
(0.3763) 
0.1902 
(0.3928) 
0.0966 
(0.2957) 
0.1563 
(0.3635) 
DS3 0.1601 
(0.3668) 
0.2294 
(0.4207) 
0.1637 
(0.3702) 
0.1536 
(0.3609) 
0.2339 
(0.4238) 
0.2248 
(0.4179) 
FOLK 0.9297 
(0.2558) 
0.9400 
(0.2377) 
0.9235 
(0.2659) 
0.9407 
(0.2365) 
0.9399 
(0.2379) 
0.9400 
(0.2377) 
HUKOU 0.9322 
(0.2515) 
0.8232 
(0.3818) 
0.9304 
(0.2546) 
0.9354  
(0.2460) 
0.7876 
(0.4095) 
0.8587 
(0.3487) 
AGE 41.1450 
(9.5179) 
37.0718 
(9.2108) 
42.2422 
(9.8293) 
39.1920 
(8.6051) 
38.6631 
(9.8245) 
35.4839   
(8.2648) 
AGE2 1783.4451 
(766.0038) 
1459.0675 
(694.6279) 
1880.9206 
(801.6919) 
1609.9285 
(664.0890) 
1591.1481 
(765.9617) 
1327.2698 
(587.1323)
MARRIED 0.8939 
(0.3081) 
0.8414 
(0.3655) 
0.8951 
(0.3066) 
0.8918 
(0.3109) 
0.8348 
(0.3718) 
0.8480 
(0.3594) 
SEX 0.6403 
(0.4801) 
0.4995 
(0.5003) 
    
METRO 0.3685 
(0.4826) 
0.3826 
(0.4863) 
0.3382  
(0.4733) 
0.4223  
(0.4944) 
0.4142 
(0.4931) 
0.3512   
(0.4779) 
EAST 0.1576 
(0.3645) 
0.2476 
(0.4318) 
0.1520 
(0.3592) 
0.1675  
(0.3738) 
0.2511 
(0.4341) 
0.2441 
(0.4300) 
TECHN 0.2681 
(0.4431) 
0.0525 
(0.2232) 
0.2245 
(0.4175) 
0.3456 
(0.4760) 
0.0429 
(0.2029) 
0.0621 
(0.2416) 
MANAGER 0.1375 
(0.3445) 
0.0429 
(0.2027) 
0.1529  
(0.3601) 
0.1100  
(0.3131) 
0.0558   
(0.2298) 
0.0300  
(0.1707) 
 
Continued 
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Table A2. Continued 
 
Variable 
Means and standard deviations 
Formal  Informal  Formal Informal 
(All) (All) (Male) (Female) (Male) (Female) 
CRAFT 0.1802 
(0.3844) 
0.0761 
(0.2653) 
0.1598 
(0.3666) 
0.2164 
(0.4122) 
0.0558 
(0.2298) 
0.0964 
(0.2954) 
SEVCL 0.0508 
(0.2198) 
0.3441 
(0.4753) 
0.0324 
(0.1770) 
0.0838 
(0.2773) 
0.2125 
(0.4095) 
0.4754 
(0.4999) 
GOVOWN 0.7859 
(0.4103) 
0.1608 
(0.3675) 
0.8049  
(0.3965) 
0.7522   
(0.4321) 
0.1760 
(0.3812) 
0.1456  
(0.3531) 
COLOWN 0.0973 
(0.2965) 
0.0965 
(0.2954) 
0.0843   
(0.2780) 
0.1204   
(0.3257) 
0.1030   
(0.3043) 
0.0899  
(0.2864 ) 
λ  
   
0.2204 
(0.3229) 
 
0.3447 
(0.4100) 
LOGINC 1.9020 
(0.6376) 
1.3430 
(0.6884) 
1.9493  
(0.6119) 
1.8178       
(0.6732) 
1.4838     
(0.6969) 
1.2026     
(0.6508) 
N  1593 933 1020 573 466 467 
Note: Quantities in parentheses are standard deviations. 
